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The problem of modeling uncertainty and inexact reasoning in 
rule-based expert systems is challenging on nonnative as well on 
cognitive grounds. First, the modular structure of the rule- 
based architecture does not lend itself to standard Bayesian 
inference techniques. Second, there is no consensus on how to 
model human (expert) judgement under uncertainty. .These factors 
have led to a proliferation of quasi-probabilistic belief calculi 
which are widely-used in practice. This paper investigates the 
descriptive and external validity of three well-known "belief 
languages:" the Bayesian, ad-hoc Bayesian, and the certainty 
factors languages. These models are implemented in many 
commercial expert system shells, and their validity is clearly an 
important issue for users and designers of expert systems. The 
methodology consists of a controlled, within-subject experiment 
designed to measure the relative performance of alternative 
belief languages. The experiment pits the judgement of human 
experts with the recommendations generated by their simulated 
expert systems, each using a different belief language. Special 
emphasis is given to the general issues of validating belief 
languages and expert systems at large. 
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1, Rule-Based Belief Languages 
Consider the following familiar problem: a faculty recruiting 
committee attempts to estimate the academic potential of a 
candidate for a junior faculty position, based on the resume and . 
recommendation letters submitted by the candidate. We will 
assume henceforth that the candidate's profile can be credibly 
encoded through a set of attributes, e-g. "has an MBA degreeIt1 
"is a foreign citizen," etc, Formally speaking, the recruiter's. 
task can be described as one of classifying a set of instantiated 
attributes (representing a particular candidate) into the two 
categories academic successw or '#academic failure, This 
inexact classification can be made continuous by assigning 
degrees of likelihood to the two alternative hypotheses. Under 
these assumptions, the recruiter's task can be formalized using 
such models as utility theory, bootstrapping, or the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process. In this paper, though, we wish to cast the 
faculty selection problem (which is just an example) in what is 
termed in artificial intelligence a "rule-based" framework, The 
resulting model is rather subjective; it is based on our own set 
of values and experience regarding the selection and promotion of 
prospective faculty members. 
We begin by describing our recruiting rationale (rule-base) and 
the candidate's profile (fact-base) in terms of hypotheses, 
pieces of evidence, and rules. Our ultimate goal is to evaluate 
the likelihood of an "academic successff hypothesis (H). We break 
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down this overall hypothesis into the three sub-hypotheses 
nresearch ability (R)," "teaching ability (T)," and "service 
potential (S).I1 These sub-hypotheses, in turn, can be linked to 
the set of attributes drawn from the candidatefs information. 
For example, if we think that "MBA degreeN (El) is related to 
Itteaching abilityt1 (T), we connect these two propositions by the 
rule <if El then T with degree of belief Bel(T,El)>. The 
resulting rule-base can be pictorially presented as an inference 
network, like the one depicted in Picture 1. 
Picture 1 
The meaning of the belief function Bel(.l.) depends on our 
choice of a belief language. According to Shafer and Tversky 
(1985), a belief language consists of syntax, calculus, and 
semantics. The syntax corresponds to the set of degrees of 
belief associated with various rules (arcs) and propositions 
(nodes). Typically, a set of atomic degrees of belief is 
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elicited from a domain expert (e.g. an experienced recruiter), 
while posterior beliefs in hypotheses are computed by a set of 
operators collectively known as a belief calculus. When a belief 
language is used in the context of an expert system, the computed 
posterior beliefs influence, if not determine, the system's 
judgement. Therefore, the semantics of the belief language can 
be viewed as a measure of the system's validity. Descriptive 
validity concerns the proximity of the system's recommendations 
to actual human judgement. External validity concerns the 
consistency of the system's judgments with the actual state of 
the world. More about that, later. 
The validity of alternative belief languages is an interesting 
question on theoretical as well as on practical grounds. Belief 
languages are typically built into expert system shells, the 
canned programs used to develop applied expert systems. Thus, 
the credibility of these languages sheds light on the integrity 
of expert systems at large. This paper investigates the 
descriptive and external validity of three well-known belief 
languages: the Bayesian, ad-hoc Bayesian, and the certainty 
factors languages. These languages are widely-used in practice, 
and versions of them are employed in most commercial expert 
systems. We now turn to present a brief review of the three 
languages, without getting into unnecessary technical clutter. 
Detailed descriptions of these models can be found elsewhere, and 
the reader will be directed to these references as we go along. 
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The normative Bavesian lancruase gives an inference network like 
the one depicted in Figure 1 a probabilistic interpretation. The 
network's nodes are viewed as a set of random variables which are 
causally interrelated. In a medical diagnosis example, the 
hypothesis H (a disease) might be viewed as the cause of the 
syndromes TI R, and S. These syndromes, in turn, may manifest 
themselves through the pieces of evidence (symptoms) (Ei). The 
strength of these causal associations may be measured through 
conditional probabilities or likelihoos ratios. For example, the 
degree of belief Bel(H,R) may be captured through P(R~H) or 
P(~lH)/P(Rlnot H), P being a probability. Going back to the 
faculty selection problem, suppose a particular candidate can be 
encoded through the instantiated attributes set E=<El,. .. ,En>. 
Given this tenuinology, evaluating the academic potential of the 
candidate E amounts to computing the posterior belief in the 
hypothesis H in light of E, P(H(E). Unfortunately, this 
computation is exponential in the number of nodes in the network, 
and , in fact, is NP-hard (Cooper, 1987) . 
If, however, the underlying joint-distribution function obeys a 
set of conditional independence assumptions, there exist 
efficient Bayesian algorithms that compute P ( H ~ E )  in time linear 
to the size of the network (e.g. Pearl, 1986). These algorithms 
hinge on the topology of the network, which, in turn, dictates 
the set of conditional independence assumptions which P is 
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assumed to possess. If these assumptions-don't hold, one can 
sometimes restructure the network in order to enforce them 
(Charniak, 1983) . 
To sum up, given that the rule-base's structure is consistent 
with a set of simplifying assumptions on PI there exist Bayesian 
belief-update algorithms which do not violate the axioms of 
probability theory. In contrast, the majority of the languages 
employed by so-called "Bayesian" expert systems like PROSPECTOR 
or AL/X are quasi-probabilistic. Like the normative case, the 
syntax of these languages consists of a set of conditional 
probabilities or likelihood-ratios, elicited from a domain 
expert. At the same time, the calculus of the Ad-Hoe Bayesian 
(AHBI lansuase is basically a heuristic version of Bayes rule, 
designed to wadjust" the computation of probabilities to the 
deductive nature of rule-based inference. This is done by 
introducing "paralleln and Hsequentialw combination functions 
which prune the inference net recursively until a set of 
posterior beliefs is computed (Duda et al, 1977). 
To illustrate, consider the application of the AHB calculus to 
the inference net depicted in Picture 1. The process begins by 
applying the parallel combination function (which is basically 
Bayes rule under the assumption of conditional independence) 
three times to compute the posterior beliefs in the sub- 
hypotheses wresearch," "teachingIW and wservice.w These 
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posterior beliefs, in turn, serve to "attenuatew the original 
degrees of belief rendered by the three sub-hypotheses to the 
"academic successm hypothesis (H). This attenuation is carried 
out by the sequential combination function. Finally, the 
attenuated degrees of belief are combined by the parallel 
combination function, yielding the overall posterior belief in 
the root hypothesis, H. 
This ad-hoc calculus is quite similar to the one employed by the 
Certaintv Factors (CF) lancruaqe. This language was first 
implemented in the MYCIN expert system (Shortliffe., 1976) and was 
subsequently incorporated in the EMYCIN and M1 (van Melle, 1984) 
expert system shells. In the CF terminology, the degree of 
belief associated with the diagnostic rule <if E then H> is the 
certainty factor CF(H~E). CF(H[E), which is elicited from a 
domain expert, measures the increased belief (or disbelief) in H 
in light of the piece of evidence E. The CF function, though, is 
not a probability. It varies from -1 to 1, corresponding to "E 
confirms not H with certaintygt and I1E confirms H with certaintytl* 
respectively. If E is irrelevant to H, the certainty factor 
CF(H~E) is set to 0. In sum, CF(H]E) measures the strength of 
the Logical entailment E->HI in the spirit of Carnapts (1954) 
confirmation function and inductive logic. Atomic CFgs are 
elicited from domain experts. If a single hypothesis is backed 
by several rules, its posterior CF is computed by the CF 
parallel combination function. If an hypothesis H is backed by 
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a reasoning chain, say, E->S->H, its posterior belief is computed 
by the CF sequential combination function. These functions are 
described in detail in (Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984). 
The mathematical properties (and limitations) of the AHB and the 
CF languages are now well understood, and the reader is referred 
to Adams (1984), Grosof (1986), Heckerman (1986), Horvitz et a1 
(1986), and Schocken and Xleindorfer (1987) for detailed 
analyses. What emerges from this research is that the AHB and 
the CF languages are essentially special cases of the Bayesian 
language, involving implicit assumptions of conditional 
independence. Moreover, these language are mathematically 
isomorphic to each other. At the same time, this normative 
proximity does not necessarily guarantee compatibility on other, 
ex-mathematical grounds. In fact, the Bayesian, AHB, and CF 
languages involve different cognitive views of inference under 
uncertainty, different elicitation procedures, and, perhaps, 
different or incompatible posterior beliefs. To emphasize this 
point, suppose we replace the AHB language employed by a rule- 
based medical diagnosis system with a CF language. If all other 
things are held equal, including the rule-base and the patient, 
it is still possible that the system will switch its prognosis 
from one disease to another. Clearly, this potential blunder 
requires serious investigation: it implies that at least one of 
the languages under consideration must be invalid. 
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The descriptive and external validity of a belief language can be 
tested only in a controlled experiment involving a realistic 
inference problem and human experts. The posterior beliefs 
assigned by the language to various hypotheses of interest can be 
then compared to either (a) a set of likelihoods assigned by a 
human expert, or, (b) a set of probabilities generated by a 
monte-carlo simulation. Such "within-languagew experiments were 
carried out by Yu et .a1 (1984) and Yadrick et a1 (1988), 
respectively. Alternatively, one can apply several belief 
languages to the same inference problem, comparing their 
resulting recommendations to each other. Such wacross-languages~ 
experiments were undertaken by Mitchell (1986), Wise (1988), and 
Kopsco et a1 (1988). 
This paper belongs to the latter category oS comparative 
studies. It involves the application of the Bayesian, AHB, and 
CF languages to the same inference task, viz, the faculty 
selection problem. The structure of the remainder of the paper 
is as follows: Section 2 consists of an example of a simple 
inference problem designed to illustrate our approach to 
measuring the descriptive and external validity of competing 
belief languages. This discussion sets the stage for the 
experimental' design, described in Section 3. Our research 
hypotheses and results are given in Section 4. A discussion and 
conclusion sections highlight the key findings. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-91-3 1 
2 ,  Pitting Human and Machine Judgement 
Let El and E2 be two independent pieces of evidence supporting a 
prospective hypothesis, H. Let P be the joint distribution 
function defined over the space {ElIE2,H), and consider the 
following likelihood-ratio notation: 
L(H) = P(H)/P(H) (fl hereafter stands for "not Hw) 
R(E~(H) = P(E~~H)/P(E~/H) 
L(H~E~,E~) = P(HIE~,E~)/P(~IE~,E~) 
In the likelihood-ratio paradigm, L(H) is the prior belief in H, 
and L(H/E~,E~) is the posterior belief in H in light of the 
evidence {El,E2). R(E~~H) is the degree of belief in the 
ttsymptomw Ei occurring when H is known to be true. 'Such degrees 
of belief can be obtained from past records, textbook 
information, and expert opinions. The question of belief-update, 
simply put, is this: given L(H), a certain body of evidence 
{El,E2), and a set of degrees of belief {R(E~IH),R(E~~H)), how 
does one go about computing the posterior belief L(HIE~,E~)? 
Under the assumption that El and E2 are ratio-independent with 
respect to H (Grosof, 1986), the normative posterior belief, 
denoted %, may be derived from Bayes rule, as follows: 
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If the R(E~~H) are elicited from human experts, which is normally 
the case, we must replace them with their estimates, R'(E~~H). 
Moreover, it is well known by now that human judgement under 
uncertainty does not confonn to (1). When left to their own 
devices, people's judgement under uncertainty is prone to a 
number of systematic biases, e.g. representativeness (Tversky and 
Xahnemna, 1974). For example, if the symptom El is very 
representative of H, most humans will unduly overweight its 
diagnostic impact on the likelihood of H. This judgmental bias 
might be represented in the following descriptive model: 
The representativeness heuristic is modeled in (2) through the 
parameters { o( , (3 , 6). Any assignment of values other than 
d = (3 = P=l consists of a violation of Bayes rule. 
Interestingly, it can be shown that parameterized versions of (2) 
are isomorphic to many non-Bayesian belief languages, e-g. the 
certainty factors and the contrast-inertia languages (Einhorn and 
Hogarth, 1987) . 
One obvious way to debias human judgement is to design a 
"Bayesian machinew like (1) whose inputs consist of elicited 
degrees of belief. This prescri~tive approach can be modeled as 
follows: 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Worhng Paper IS-91-3 1 
in order to investigate the comparative validity of (I), ( 2 ) ,  
and ( 3 ) ,  we must assume that the three models are based on the 
sane human expert working on a fixed inference problem. This is 
emphasized in Picture 2. The three triangles T, D, and S 
correspond to the belief calculi (I), (2), and ( 3 ) ,  respectively. 
Each of these models takes as input the body of evidence 
E={El,E2) and goes on to compute the posterior belief in the 
hypothesis H in light of E. The notation Ri is an abbreviation 
of R(E~~H). The T triangle represents the normative belief- 
update model (1) which generates the true posterior belief, %. 
G is an elicitation operator replacing true degrees of belief, 
Rit with their human-provided estimates, Ri'. The D triangle 
represents the expert's own, abstract, decision process (model 
(2)): when presented with the body of evidence, E, the expert 
sets his posterior belief in H to LD, which may or may not 
coincide with the true posterior belief, h. The S triangle 
represents model (3) , i. e. a Bayesian "inference enginet1 
operating on human inputs. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-91-3 1 
Picture 2 
The preceding discussion and Picture 2 give rise to the 
following definitions of three relevant performance measures: 
ILD - ~ p )  : expert's external validity 
ILS - : system's external validity 
ILS - L ~ I  : system's descriptive validity 
The distinction between expert's and system's external validity 
was illustrated dramatically in the MXCIN experiments. In order 
to test the plausibility of MYCIN's therapeutic advice, the 
program was fed with diagnostic information regarding ten 
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patients with infectious meningitis (Yu et al, 1984). MYCIN'S 
recommended therapy (analog of LS) was then evaluated by a panel 
of leading medical experts whose opinions were taken to 
represent the truth (analog of +) . The panel judged MYCIN to be 
correct 75% of the time. Viewed in isolation, this measure of 
systemqs external validity appeared to be rather discouraging. 
However, these same cases were then presented to a group of eight 
Stanford physicians. Surprisingly, the recommended therapy of 
the human experts (analog of LD) received an external validity 
rating which was uniformally lower than 75% in view of the same 
panel of experts who evaluated MYCIN. 
In general, the external validity of an expert system might 
exceed that of its underlying expert. Indeed, the management 
science literature is rife with examples in which computer-based 
models, e.g. linear models, have been known to systematically 
outperform human experts (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974). 
Incidentally, these mechanical variance-minimizing models have no 
descriptive appeal whatsoever. This also gives rise to the 
argument that, unlike other efforts in artificial intelligence, 
descriptive validity is not necessarily a good measure of expert 
system performance: "Evidence about human reasoning including 
introspection may give us excellent ideas for devising new and 
better systems, but the criteria for judging their usefulness 
should be the quality of their performance, rather than how well 
they simulate human thought processes (Henrion, 1986). 
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Finally, note that the expert's external validity is an intrinsic 
property of the expert, At the same time, we expect that the 
external and descriptive validity of an expert system will vary 
with our choice of a belief language. In Picture 2, there is 
only one such prescriptive language, represented by the S 
triangle. More such languages may be considered, with the 
provision that all languages draw on the same expert who is 
working on a fixed inference problem. These different languages 
are likely to yield different posterior beliefs. By comparing 
these beliefs to LT and LD (which are fixed), we can make 
statements about the relative validity of the underlying 
languages. Ideally, these statements should withstand the test 
of statistical significance. This is the crux of our experiment. 
3, Experimental Design 
The experimental task involved the faculty selection problem 
discussed in the beginning of the paper. An opening of a tenure- 
track faculty position in a major university typically attracts 
dozens of candidates. Each candidate submits a resume and 
recommendation letters, which are then scrutinized by a 
recruiting committee. The committee has to decide which 
candidates should be invited to on-site interviews. This task is 
normally carried out through some sort of a "phasedf1 strategy 
consisting of screening and ranking (Bettman, 1979). First, 
inferior candidates are eliminated sequentially from 
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consideration. The remaining candidates are then compared to 
each other in a more holistic sense, For example, the first 
phase might employ an elimination by aspects strategy, in which a 
criterion is chosen, e.g, "research interests," and all the 
candidates who do not measure up are rejected. This process is 
repeated with additional criteria, until a smaller but more 
focused pool of candidates remains for further consideration. 
The process terminates when candidates can no longer be evaluated 
on the basis of a single criterion. At that stage, the decision 
maker resorts to a compensatory, holistic strategy which 
. considers several attributes simultaneously. This. latter stage 
is the general context in which our experiment took place. 
The subjects in the experiment were 12 senior Ph.D.-students and 
3 professors at a decision sciences department. Each subject 
was randomly assigned to one of two groups, Group I and Group 11. 
The experiment consisted of three stages, as follows: 
Human Rankinss: The subject was given a set of ten resumes of 
hypothetical candidates who presumably applied for a job at the 
subjectts decision sciences department. The subject was told 
that the experiment evolves around determining the potential 
academic success of these candidates. A measure of 8'academic 
successw was explicitly defined as the answer to the following 
question: what is the likelihood that a particular candidate will 
be offered tenure in the decision sciences department within 6 
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years from his or her first appointment, given all the 
information that can be extracted from the candidate's resume? 
The subject was then asked to rank-order the ten candidates in 
decreasing order of academic success. The resulting ranking, 
termed "human ranking," is denoted LH1. The subject performed 
this ranking without the interruption or assistance of any formal 
model, although he or she was allowed to use paper, pencil, and a 
calculator. 
The subject was then told that a rule-based inference system 
based on his individual preferences will now be constructed, and 
that the system-generated ranking of the ten candidates will be 
compared to his original human ranking. A financial compensation 
was offered as follows: the subject received a flat $5 
participation fee, plus a performance bonus which was 
proportional to the correlation found between the subject's 
ranking and the system's ranking. This bonus ranged from $1 to 
$50 for the worst and best correlation detected in the 
experiment, respectively. 
Knowledae Elicitation: Following the human ranking, each subject 
underwent an elaborate knowledge elicitation procedure 
administered by the experimenter, who played the role of a 
knowledge engineer. First, the general principles of rule-based 
inference were presented to the subject, who was allowed to ask 
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questions and receive further clarificatiops. The rule-base 
depicted in Picture 1 was offered as a point of departure toward 
the subject's specific rule-base. First, the experimenter 
suggested that the information extracted from the candidates1 
resumes could be encoded through a set of attributes. The 
subject was then encouraged to refine this set by deleting 
irrelevant attributes or adding new ones which he or she 
perceived important. The refined set amounted to the bottom 
tier of the inference net depicted in Picture 1. The subject was 
then asked to connect all the nodes in the network which he 
thought were causally related to each other. The topology and 
contents of the resulting network (rule-base) varied widely 
across subjects. 
Next, the experimenter proceeded to elicit the degrees of belief 
associated with each rule in the subject's rule-base. Each group 
of subjects received a different belief language "treatment:" 
subjects in Group I and I1 were asked to express their degrees of 
belief using the language of conditional probabilities and 
certainty factors, respectively. For example, let's assume that 
a subject thought that llconsulting experience1' is relevant to 
"teaching ability.' If the subject belonged to Group I, he or 
she was posed with the following pair of causal questions: 
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Assume that x is a good teacher. 
What is your belief, as a subjective probability, 
that x has consulting experience? 
Assume that x is not a good teacher. 
What is your belief, as a subjective probability, 
that x has consulting experience? 
If the subject belonged to Group 11, he or she was asked to 
answer the following pair of diaanostic questions:. 
Assume that x has consulting experience. 
To what extent does this fact increase (or decrease) your 
belief that x will become a good teacher? 
Assume that x has no consulting experience. 
To what extent does this fact increase (or decrease) your 
belief that x will become a good teacher? 
. 
A series of similar questions then ensued, one pair for each 
rule in the subject's rule-base. This completed the 
construction of a rule-base which presumably captured the 
ranking rationale of the human expert (subject). 
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Two months later, the subjects were recalled, and the very same 
sequel ensued: first, the subject was given the resumes of the 
very same ten candidates that he or she has evaluated two months 
earlier. Each subject then generated a second ranking of the 
candidates, denoted LH~. Next, each subject was presented with 
exactly the same rule-base that he or she has constructed 
originally, with one,exception: the degrees of belief which 
parameterized the rules were omitted- Finally, the elicitation 
treatment was switched: subjects from group I were asked to 
express their degrees of belief in each rule usinythe certainty 
factors language, while group I1 subjects expressed their belief 
in terms of conditional probabilities. This completed the 
subject's participation in the experiment. 
Machine rankinss: Using the inputs provided by the subjects, 
three expert systems (per subject) were constructed. These 
systems were implemented through a Prolog-based inference engine 
designed specifically to take a belief language as an external 
parameter (Schocken and Finin, 1987). The three systems, which 
operated on the same rule-base, varied only in their dependance 
on a CF, Bayesian, and ad-hoc ~ayesian belief calculi. The three 
systems were then fed with the ten encoded resumes, and went on 
to generate three candidate rankings in terms of posterior 
probabilities, ad-hoc posterior probabilities, and certainty 
factors. These rankings are denoted LB,  LA^^, and L C ~ ,  
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respectively. Note that the three systems were identical in 
their reliance on the same rule-base, fact-base, and expert. 
These factors were tightly controlled, varying only the belief 
calculus "treatment. ff 
FIRST 
HUMAN RANKING > L n i  
ELICITATlON 
BAYESIAN 
RANKING > L B  
RANKING > ,B 
m MONTHS LATER 
HUMAN RANKING 
C F  
RANKING 
Picture 3 
Picture 3 is a summary of the experiment, describing the various 
stages undertaken by Group I subjects (for Group I1 subjects, 
replace the order of the Bayesian and the CF treatments). 
Altogether, each subject generated two direct human rankings (LH1 
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and k) and three indirect machine-based rankings (LB, LAHB, 
LC*). The correlations among these rankings were used as 
measures of subject's reliability and system's descriptive and ' 
external validity. These measures are discussed in the next 
section. 
4, Hypotheses and Results 
Picture 4 depicts the various rankings and correlations 
investigated in the experiment. Each node (excluding k, which 
will be discussed shortly) represents a ranking of the ten 
resumes, generated either by a human subject or by an expert 
system simulating the same subject. and L H ~  are the two 
human rankings, spaced two months apart. The remaining three 
nodes correspond to the rankings generated by the three expert 
systems. All three systems drew on the same rule-base of the 
subject that generated and %2, and all operated on the same 
fact-base (i.e. the ten resumes). 
L ~ B  L T 
Picture 4 
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(This figure depicts the comparisons made within Group I (Bayes 
first, then CF). For Group I1 comparisons (CF first, then 
Bayes), replace LH1 with LH2). 
% represents the *vtrue,'v ex-post ranking of the ten resumes. 
That is, assuming that we have a crystal ball, % gives the 
actual, rather than the predicted academic performance of the ten 
candidates. In the context of medical diagnosis, % would 
represent the actual physical state of the patient, which, 
unfortunately, can often be determined only through a radical 
procedure such as autopsy or surgery. The need for a "gold 
standardw and the realization that such standard is not 
necessarily subject to observation was addressed by Buchanan and 
Shortliffe (1984): "In general there are two views of how to 
define a gold standard for an expert system's domain: (1) what 
eventually turns out to be the wcorrect" answer for a problem, 
and (2) what a human expert says is the correct answer when 
presented with the same information as is available to the 
program. It is unfortunate that for many kinds of problems with 
which expert systems are designed to assist, the first of these 
questions cannot be answered or is irrelevant.!: 
In the MYCIN experiments, absolute truth was approximated by the 
opinion of a distinguished panel of internists. A similar 
approach was taken here. The true ranking of the ten candidates, 
Lpr was estimated by the pooled human rankings of the three 
subjects in the experiment who were professors in the decision 
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sciences department. These professors are actively involved in 
faculty recruiting and promotion decisions; In reality, they 
(among other professors) would be responsible for judging the 
actual academic performance of the ten candidates, had they been 
hired. Thus, given the experiment's context, this pooled ranking 
seemed to be a reasonable approximation of the actual tenure 
prospects of the ten hypothetical candidates. 
The arcs in Picture 4 represent estimates of reliability and 
validity. In particular, the arc (LifLj) represents the Spearman 
rank-correlation coefficient R(Li,Lj). A subject is said to be 
reliable if R(LH1,LH2) is close to 1, indicating that the subject 
did not change his preferences over a period of two months. This 
hypothesis was confirmed informally by inspection: in 80% of the 
subjects, R was greater than 0.794, the critical value above 
which the population correlation coefficient is significant at 
the 0.005 level. All the subjects had significant reliability 
coefficients at the 0.10 level. 
Within a particular (group I) subject, the Bayesian language is 
said to exhibit a higher descriptive validitv than the CF 
language if R(LB,LH1) is significantly greater than R(LCFfLH2) 
(for Group I1 subjects, replace L H ~  and LH2). Of course, this 
statement gains extra strength if the subject is highly reliable. 
Similarly, within a particular subject, the Bayesian language is 
said to exhibit a higher external validitv than the CF language 
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if R(LB,%)>R(LCF,$)- similar hypotheses can be formulated 
regarding the AHB language. Finally, the Bayesian model is said 
to outperform its corresponding human subject (Group I) if 
R ( L B I % ) > R ( ~ l , ~ ) .  Similar statements can be made with regard 
to the CF and the AHB languages. 
The above hypotheses are all within-subject, In order to test 
their significance across the 15 subjects, a sign test was. 
administered. For example, we say that the Bayesian language 
outperformed the CF language in terms of descriptive validity if 
the relationship R (LB, LH1) >R (LC*, Lg2) was found to. be significant 
in a sign-test applied to the 15 pairs <Ri(LBILH1),Ri(LCF,LH2)>r 
i=1,15, i being the subjects index. 
The results of the sign tests are given in Table 1. The 
notation BAYES>>CF stands for "the Bayesian language outperformed 
the CF languagew in the category indicated by the columnfs 
heading. For example, the first entry reads as follows: in terms 
of descriptive validity, the Bayesian model outperformed the CF 
model in 60% of the subjects. The remainder of the entries read 
similarly. 
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Hypothesis Descriptive 
Validity 
---------- ----------- 
BAYES>>CF 60% 
External 
Validity 
-------- 
73% (*) 
( * ) :  significant at p=0.059 (single-tailed) 
(**) :  significant at p=0.017 (single-tailed) 
Table 1 
We see that the Bayesian and the AHB languages outperformed the 
CF language in terms of descriptive as well as external validity. 
However, only the external validity results are statistically 
significant. No statistical difference was detected between the 
Bayesian and the AHB languages. A more elaborate discussion of 
the experiment's results is given in the next section. 
Our choice of a non-parametric test was based on a reluctance to 
make any assumptions regarding the underlying distribution of 
the experimental observations, i.e. the calculated rank- 
correlation coefficients. In addition, it was felt that although 
these coefficients were suspectable to ordering, their absolute 
values were quite meaningless. Under such circumstances, the 
sign-test is a powerful device in detecting populations 
differences. In the case of n=15 observations, QC -0.1, and an 
expected large size effect, the power of a bidirectional 
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sign-test is 0.69, meaning that there are 69% chances of 
detecting a population difference, if such exists. ~ccording to 
Cohen (1965, p. 98), this power is consistent with the 
convention that Type I errors be guarded against about four times 
as stringently as Type I1 errors. 
5 ,  Discussion 
Any empirical study involving the elicitation of subjective 
degrees of belief is prone to the problems of unreliabilitv and 
inconsistencv. As Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1980) 
indicate, it would be inappropriate to think of a-person's 
opinion about a set of events as existing within that person in a 
precise, fixed fashion, just waiting to be measured. Unreliable 
humans exhibit temporal changes in their beliefs with no apparent 
reason. Consequently, reliability can be measured in terms of 
correlations between two different encodings of the same set of 
events by the same subject at different times. Needless to say, 
this test is based on the premise that the subject did not have 
any (non-noise) reason to change his preferences and beliefs over 
this time period. 
Inconsistency occurs when elicited degrees of belief do not 
respect the axioms (or "grammarw) of the underlying language. 
One major source of unreliability and inconsistency is low 
motivation: subjects are often eager to "get donew with the 
experiment, and, as a result, the input that they provide does 
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not necessarily reflect their true preferences and beliefs. This 
attitude is quite distracting when students assume the role of 
domain experts. While the former are typically indifferent to 
the task at hand, the latter are highly motivated and genuinely 
concerned about the accuracy and validity of their inferential 
procedures. 
Subiect Reliability: Subject's reliability was controlled by 
asking the subjects to rank-order the same set of ten resumes 
twice, with the second ranking being done two months after the 
first. From a cognitive standpoint, the faculty selection 
problem was rather challenging: the academic credentials of the 
ten candidates were arranged in such a way that there were 
neither clear cut winners nor downright losers. Therefore, the 
subjects had to deal with a multi-attribute choice problem with 
no dominating alternatives. During the human rankings stage, the 
subjects employed a variety of heuristic compensatory decision 
rules as well as sheer intuitive judgment. The quickest and 
slowest (or most diligent) subjects required 30 and 85 minutes to 
complete the ranking, respectively. Average completion time was 
55 minutes. 
With that in mind, it was rather encouraging to find that the 
two human rankings of most of the subjects were highly 
correlated. Although no subject succeeded to reproduce his first 
ranking entirely, 80% of the subjects exhibited a highly 
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significant correlation (R>0.745) between the two human rankings. 
This high degree of reliability might be attributed to two 
factors. First, the subjects were promised a substantial 
financial award (as much as $55) that was proportional to the 
correlations found in the experiment. This also generated a 
positive contest spirit that motivated the subjects to outperform 
their peers. 
Second, the experiment's context, which was directly related to 
the subjectsf career interests, proved to be rather lively. Any 
senior Ph.D. student has a strong position regarding the 
relative importance of teaching, research, and service in 
promoting professors. The experiment gave the subjects an 
opportunity to formulate these preferences and express them in a 
systematic fashion. This provoked some interesting responses. 
For example, one subject argued that evidence of good teaching 
skills discounts the likelihood of a promotion, as devoted 
teachers are likely to spend less time on research, which is far 
more important in tenure decisions. Indeed, the three 
machine-based rankings of this subject tended to favor candidates 
with no teaching credentials, as did his two human rankings. 
Subiect Consistency: Consistency checks may be introduced in 
order to adjust subject's response to a certain standard. For 
example, a Bayesian elicitation procedure might force subjects to 
revise their judgment once a violation of the axioms of 
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subjective probabilities is detected. This practice was avoided 
here for two reasons. First, the merit of forced normalizations 
is still under debate. For example, Robinson and Hastie (1985) 
demonstrated that when subjects were forced to normalize their 
responses, the responses became more error-prone. Second, it is 
unclear how to perform consistency checks on certainty factors, 
short of translating them to probabilities and normalizing their 
Bayesian images. Consequently, any attempt to employ a 
language-dependant normalization scheme would introduce an unfair 
advantage or disadvantage to this particular trtreatment.tv Since 
the experiment was concerned primarily with the relative, rather 
than the absolute, performance of various belief languages, it 
was felt that such practice should be avoided. 
Descriptive validitv: There is by now an overwhelming body of 
psychological evidence indicating that human judgment under 
uncertainty is not governed by, and often violates, the axioms of 
subjective probability. This realization was partially 
responsible for the original development of the CF calculus, 
which was supposed to be a better descriptive model than the 
Bayesian belief-update procedure, Nonetheless, the superior 
descriptive power of the CF language, if it indeed exists, did 
not manifest itself in this experiment. In particular, the sign 
tests detected no significant differences between the 
descriptive validity of the Bayesian and the CF languages, with 
the former outperforming the latter in 60% of the subjects. In 
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addition, no significant differences between the CF and the AHB 
and the AHB and the Bayesian languages were detected in terms of 
descriptive validity. 
The normative Bayesian calculus is based on a mechanical 
integration of probabilities which, in our judgment, appears to 
have little if any descriptive appeal. Therefore, we expected 
ex-ante that the Bayesian language will perform poorly on 
descriptive grounds. The fact that the Bayesian language 
performed as well as the CF and AHB languages in this regard may 
be attributed to lack of statistical power. At the same time, 
this is indeed a preliminary indication that the Bayesian 
approach to rule-based inference should not be written off on the 
basis of a weak descriptive appeal. 
External Validitv: the hypotheses on external validity were based 
on the premise that the pooled ranking, LI(, can be credibly 
viewed as a measure of the ex-post, actual academic performance 
of the ten hypothetical candidates. In what follows, we defend 
this assumption and argue that it is indeed reasonable under the 
experiment's circumstances. 
First, recall that the subjects were explicitly asked to asses 
the likelihood that the candidates will be offered tenure not on 
the basis of an abstract measure of divine academic justice, but, 
rather, on the basis of their expected performance in a specific 
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decision sciences department which the subjects knew very well, 
Tenure recommendations in this department are normally made by a 
group of professors. Three members of this group participated in 
the experiment as subjects. Hence, the opinions of these 
professors reflect closely what would have taken place if the 
candidates were actually evaluated by decision sciences faculty 
members, 
Second, the literature on encoding subjective probabilities, an 
area which is closely related to our present concern, includes 
several examples in which synthetically (mathematically) 
determined consensus groups did much better than the average 
individual in terms of external validity (Huber, 1974)- This 
finding was also reported by Stael Von Holstein (1972) who had 
groups of financial experts estimate the next 14-days stock 
prices. In a similar vein, Winkler (1968) had reported that 
consensus groups outperformed almost all individuals, regardless 
of the various weighing schemes used to generate their pooled 
judgments. 
Given that the pooled ranking, k, is indeed a reasonable 
yardstick for actual performance, it was hypothesized that its 
correlation with the Bayesian-based ranking will be greater than 
the corresponding correlation with the ad-hoc CF-based ranking. 
Indeed, this relationship held for 73% of the subjects, a 
significant dominance at the (single-tailed) 0.059 level. This 
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result makes sense: notwithstanding the poor intuitive appeal of 
the Bayesian calculus, one would hope that its normative rigor 
would produce more accurate predictions than its ad-hoc 
counterparts. Incidentally, the high external validity , of the 
Bayesian calculus was demonstrated in a number of other, 
unrelated empirical studies. For example, Gustafson (1969) had 
physicians assess Bayesian likelihood-ratios regarding various 
clues that explain the length of hospital stay of potential 
patients. After aggregating these assessments using Bayes rule, 
he found that the resulting estimates were far closer to the 
truth than the predictions made by a linear regression model 
employing actuarial data. 
One peculiar result of the present study is the strong external 
validity of the ad-hoc Bayesian (AHB) language. A possible 
explanation might be that the AHB syntax, consisting of 
conditional probabilities, is identical to the normative Bayesian 
syntax. At the same time, the naive AHB sequential combination 
function (used to propagate posterior beliefs "upwardsat the 
network) is at least as ad-hoc as the CF sequential combination 
function. Therefore, one would expect, ex ante, that the AHB 
language, like the CF language, would perform poorly in terms of 
external validity. In practice, though, the AHB and the Bayesian 
rankings turned to be very similar. 
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In the Yadrick et a1 (1988) simulation study, the AHB language 
(restricted to what they called "independent rule setsm) was 
generally very accurate, with an overall average error (the 
absolute value of PROSPECTORss estimate minus the true 
probability) as low as 0.014. At the same time, the inference 
trees that Yadrick et a1 simulated were single-leveled, meaning 
that the problematic AHB sequential combination function was not 
to a test. theref ore encouraging to report that the 
AHB language performs well in a two-level network, such as the 
one used in the present experiment. Whether or not the AHB 
language is externally valid in more complicated inference 
. networks is remained to be seen in future research. 
6. Conclusion 
The major findings obtained in the limited context of this 
experiment are as follows. First, contrary to certain claims, 
the CF language is not a better descriptive model than the 
Bayesian language. Second, in terms of external validity, the 
Bayesian and the ad-hoc Bayesian languages dominate the CF 
language. The reader is encouraged to qualify these results with 
the fact that the experiment consisted of 15 subjects, and, 
consequently, the descriptive power of the CF language, if it 
indeed exists, may have gone undetected due to lack of 
statistical power. 
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So the question remains -- which belief language should a 
knowledge engineer employ in the next expert system that he or 
she is developing? It seems safe to suggest that, in spite of 
its vast popularity, the CF * language scores low in all respects, 
namely normative f ouhdat ion, descriptive validity, and external 
validity. The AHB language performed quite well in our 
experiment, but there seems to be no clear explanation why. The 
Bayesian language thus emerges as the only language of choice in 
non-deterministic, rule-based, expert systems. 
It is important to remember, though, that Bayesian inference in 
complex belief networks is generally NP-hard (Cooper, 1987). If, 
however, the joint distribution function underlying the rule- 
base obeys certain assumptions of conditional independence, one 
can credibly employ the new Bayesian inference algorithms 
developed by Pearl (1986) and his colleagues. Computational 
complexity was not a problem in our experiment, due to the 
relatively small networks that we have used. More complicated 
. networks might require restructuring and addition of extra nodes 
in order to remove dependencies and make the underlying joint 
distribution function amenable to efficient Bayesian algorithms. 
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